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Abstract: While the health risks associated with smoking are well known, the impact on income 
distributions is not. This paper extends the literature by examining the distributional effects of a 
behavioral choice, in this case smoking, on net marginal Social Security tax rates (NMSSTR). The results 
show that smokers, as a result of shorter life expectancies, incur a higher NMSSTR than nonsmokers. In 
addition, as low-earnings workers have a higher smoking prevalence than high-earnings workers, smoking 
works to widen the income distribution. This higher tax rate could have implications for both labor supply 
behavior and Social Security system funding. 
 
JEL classification: H55, I1 
 
Key words: smoking, Social Security, health, taxes, widows, low earnings  
 
1
Smoking:  Taxing Health and Social Security 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Cigarette smoking is the largest single health risk in the United States, accounting for 
approximately 440,000 deaths each year (USDHHS, 2004a).  The financial cost of smoking- 
attributable health care expenditures and lost productivity has been well documented (CDC, 
2003).  In general, smokers have higher healthcare expenditures and more sick days than do 
nonsmokers (Max, 2001).  However, the effects of smoking-attributable mortality on income 
distributions is less well known. 
Premature death attributable to smoking may redistribute Social Security income in 
unanticipated ways that affect behavior and reduce the economic well-being of smokers and their 
family members (dependent spouses and children) (Rice, 1986).   Knowledge of how smoking 
redistributes both individual and household Social Security benefits and taxes is important not 
only from the perspectives of informing smoking cessation efforts (Rice, 1986) and evaluating 
proposals to improve family welfare through reductions in system inequities or promotion of 
social adequacy, but also from the standpoint of the system’s finances.  Social Security is 
financed by a pay-as-you-go payroll tax levied on earnings; thus, if the harmful health effects of 
smoking reduce individual or household hours of work, there are implications for the system’s 
funding.     
Economists employ the comprehensive marginal tax rate to assess the distortionary effect 
of taxation on labor supply and welfare (Armour & Pitts, 2004).  One important component of 
this comprehensive marginal tax rate in the United States is the Social Security payroll tax, 
which is assessed on individual earnings up to the annual taxable maximum.  In 2002,  
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approximately 94% of all U.S. workers earned less than the annual taxable maximum of 
$84,900, thus incurring an Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) Social Security payroll tax at 
the margin.
1 For these individuals, Social Security is a benefit tax where an extra dollar of 
earnings may increase their future benefits at retirement.  Therefore, the net marginal Social 
Security tax rate (NMSSTR), which is defined as the difference between the statutory payroll tax 
rate and the present value of the stream of future benefits to which an additional dollar of 
earnings entitles the covered worker, should be used in calculating the marginal tax rate for the 
purpose of assessing the effect of taxation on labor supply and welfare.
2 
Studies that have used the NMSSTR to examine the distributional effects of Social 
Security concluded that Social Security benefit and tax rules create NMSSTRs that treat workers 
differently depending on age, gender, race, dependency status, earnings, insurance status, and 
income-related life expectancy (e.g., Aaron, 1977; Browning, 1985; Burkhauser & Turner, 1985; 
Feldstein & Samwick, 1992; Armour & Pitts, 2004).    To our knowledge, no study has looked at 
lifestyle and the harmful health effects of an addictive habit such as smoking on NMSSTR 
estimation.  This study contributes to the literature by examining the distributional effects of 
smoking-attributable mortality on NMSSTR estimation.     
 
II. Methods 
A. Social Security Benefit Determination 
The Social Security benefits to which a covered worker is entitled at retirement depends 
on lifetime earnings.  Average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) is the measure of lifetime 
earnings on which benefits are based.  Earnings are indexed by multiplying the workers taxable  
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earnings by an indexing factor for each year after 1950 through the indexing year.  The indexing 
year is defined as the year a worker attains age 60.  The indexing factor for each year, t, is 
obtained by dividing average covered worker earnings in the indexing year,E t 60, , by average 
covered worker earnings at each age, a, in each year, (E t a, ).  The AIME for individuals retiring 
in year t is 
. E     +   E  
E






  = AIME
B t t A t t
t a,
t 60, ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈      (1) 
For individuals attaining age 62 after 1991, the AIME is based on the highest 35 years of 
earnings.  However, for each year a worker is born before 1929, the number of years, n, in the 
computation period is reduced by one.  To convert the AIME from an annual to a monthly basis, 
1/12 is used.  Et  denotes worker earnings in year t.  The set of all years through age 60 that will 
be counted among the highest 35 or n years of earnings is denoted by A.  B denotes the set of 
years between age 60 and the year prior to retirement that a year of unindexed earnings replaces 
a year of indexed earnings in the benefit formula. 
Once the AIME is determined, the primary insurance amount (PIA), which is the amount 
of monthly benefits payable at retirement, may be calculated.
3  The benefits formula for a 
covered worker attaining age 62 in 2002 is 
3567)). $ ( (15%             
$3567)) ($592 (32% $592)) ( (90%
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The PIA is composed of two parts: the bend points and the marginal replacement rates.  The 
bend points are the dollar amounts defining the AIME bracket in the benefit formula.  The 
marginal replacement rate is the applicable percentage used to determine the PIA.
4   
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The benefit formula illustrates one fundamental feature of the system: the progressive 
structure of Social Security.  Low-earnings workers are afforded proportionately greater benefits 
with a marginal replacement rate of 90%, when compared with average-earnings and high-
earnings workers whose marginal replacement rates of 32% and 15%, respectively.  Because the 
Social Security benefit formula is structured in a manner that classifies workers into one of three 
earnings groups, the NMSSTR by sex and age is calculated for a representative worker in each 
group. 
B.  Calculation of the NMSSTR 
NMSSTRs by sex, age, and earnings classification are calculated under two alternative 
scenarios: the first scenario uses a common mortality assumption and the second scenario 
accounts for smoking-attributable mortality in calculating the NMSSTR.  
The NMSSTR is  B   -   T   =   T PV
~
.  T  denotes the OASI statutory rate which is defined as the 
combined employee-employer legislated rate.  The combined employee-employer tax rate was 
10.6% in 2002.
5  This analysis assumes that the tax is paid by the employee.
6 
 
Primary Beneficiary (Single)   
The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a $1 change 
in earnings is 















 max   (3) 
The future benefits that an additional dollar of earnings entitles an individual to at retirement 





, and the age, a, at which the individual plans  
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to retire.  Workers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age, f .
7  The indexing 
factor at each age,  ) g + (1
a) - (60 max , is estimated assuming that earnings grow at a real rate of 
1.1%.
8   The probability that an individual of sex s and age a in year t will be eligible for benefits 
at age f in year t

 ( a - f + t   =   t

) is denoted byi t , t f, s,
 .
9 
10  The probability of an individual of 
sex s surviving from age a to age j is denoted by  a). | (j P t s,  N is the age at which all persons are 
assumed to be dead and is set at 100 in all calculations.  The rate at which a worker discounts 
future benefits, r, is set at 3% in all calculations.
11  
To illustrate, consider the case of a male who is 55 years old in 2002 and plans to retire at 
age 66 in 2011.  Because he will attain age 62 after 1991, the AIME is based on the highest 35 
years of earnings.  Earnings through age 60 are indexed to the growth rate in average covered 
earnings.  Assuming that real earnings grow at a rate of 1.1% annually, 
then . . = ) g + (1
) 5 - (60 056 1
5 max  An additional dollar of earnings at age 55 increases average indexed 
earnings by $(1/35)(1.056) ≈ $0.03. 
Assuming that the 55-year-old male is a lifetime average wage earner his marginal 
replacement rate is 0.32 and an extra dollar of earnings at age 55 would increase the PIA by 
$(0.03)(0.32) ≈ $0.0097.  The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting 





5 5 0097 . 0 ∑   The discounted sum of 
survival probabilities for a male age 55 is 7.838.  Multiplying 0.076 (0.0097 x 7.838) by the 
probability that a 55-year-old male will be eligible for social security benefits at the full benefit 
retirement age, 0.931, yields an estimate of  . 0705 0. BPV ≈  Subtracting 0.0705 from the statutory 
rate yields 0.0355, or 3.55%.     
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NMSSTRs for representative low-, average-, and high-earning workers by sex and select 
ages in 2002 are shown in Table 1.  The estimates reveal that males and females at each age face 
a NMSSTR that is less than the statutory rate.  The estimates indicate that the NMSSTR declines 
with age.  The age differential is due to higher conditional survival probabilities and the fact that 
older workers have a shorter period over which to discount future benefits.  Also, low-earnings 
workers incur the lowest NMSSTR.  Given the progressive nature of the benefit formula, this is 
as expected.    
Across earnings classes, females at most ages incur a lower NMSSTR than do males.  
The estimated NMSSTR for a low-earnings female age 55 is 1.12 percentage points lower than 
the rate faced by her male counterpart (-10.34% compared with -9.22%). Gender differences in 
the NMSSTR are approximately 0.4 percentage points for average-earnings individuals and 0.2 
percentage points for high-earnings individuals age 55.  The gender differential in the NMSSTR 
is attributable to the longer life expectancy of females.  The NMSSTR for a female age 65 with 
average lifetime earnings is 0.9 percentage points higher than the rate for her male counterpart.  
Older females incur a higher NMSSTR because they have less of an attachment to the labor 
force and thus have a lower probability of being fully insured for benefits.
12   
 
Primary Beneficiary and Dependent Spouse 
Women who are married and do not work outside the home or fail to qualify for benefits 
based on their own earnings histories may qualify for dependent spouse benefits.  Thus, the 
present value of anticipated future benefits also depends on whether a primary beneficiary claims 
benefits for a dependent spouse.
13  A dependent spouse is entitled to an additional 50% of the  
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primary beneficiary’s benefit amount at retirement.  In addition, if the primary beneficiary dies, 
the widow is entitled to 100% of the primary beneficiary’s benefit.
14  The formula, obtained from 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992), for calculating the present value of the change in anticipated 
future benefits resulting from a one-dollar change in earnings for a male worker age a with a 
dependent spouse is shown in Equation 4.   
) r + (1   )   E PIA(f,   a) | (j P   a) | (j P     +
) r + (1   w) PIA(f,   a) | (j P     +
) r + (1   a) | (j P   )   E PIA(j,   a) | 1 + (j P   -   a) | (j P     =   B
j - a
























where, 1 = male, 2 = female, and a dependent female spouse is assumed to be the same age as 
her husband.  The definitions of the other characters are identical to those for a single primary 
beneficiary.  
The first term of Equation 4 denotes the expected value of the widow’s benefits 
conditional on the worker dying at age a.  The second term denotes the expected value of the 
primary beneficiary’s retirement benefit conditional on attaining the full benefit retirement age, f. 
The third term denotes the expected value of the dependent spouse’s benefit conditional on both 
parties reaching the full benefit retirement age. 
Because beneficiaries with a dependent spouse do not pay any additional taxes for the 
additional benefit, they incur a lower NMSSTR than do singles.  The NMSSTR for an average 
earning male age 55 with a dependent spouse, assuming a discount rate of 3%, is -0.02% (see 
Table 1).  This negative tax rate is a net marginal subsidy and is lower than the rate incurred by 





The progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula is based on a common mortality 
assumption.  However, the literature contains evidence that smoking reduces life expectancy 
(USDHHS 2004a).  Life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics are used to 
construct and account for differences in life expectancy among current, former, and never 
smokers in determining NMSSTRs.  The approach utilizes the mortality ratios of Thun, Day-
Lally, Myers, Calle, Flanders, Zhu et al. (1997) and current and former smoking prevalence 
estimates for persons age 35-64 made available by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention for 2002 (CDC, 2004).  The method of estimation is described below.   
Estimates of the total number of survivors,la , by sex, s, and exact age,a, are shown in 
Table A.1.  The probability of an individual of sex s surviving from age a to age j is
l




 The mortality rate at each age is calculated by subtracting survival probabilities at each age from 
1. 
The mortality ratio which is the ratio of one group’s death rate to that of the population 
was used to split the file table into three tables: one for current smokers, one for former smokers, 







a SS = , .  The mortality rate for the total population isq a T, , and q a SS, denotes the mortality 
rate by smoking status.  For example, the mortality rate for current smokers by sex and exact age 
is calculated as follows:  q     M   =   q a T, a CS, a CS, × .  For persons age 21 through 35 the mortality ratio for 
male and female current and former smokers was assumed to be one.  For males age 35 and older  
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the mortality ratio for current smokers and former smokers were 2.30 and 1.46, respectively.  For 
female current and former smokers age 35 and older the mortality ratios were 1.92 and 1.30, 
respectively.
15   
To determine the number of survivors by smoking class it was initially assumed that 
23.2% of men were current smokers and 34.3% were former smokers.  For women, it was 
initially assumed that 18.7% were current smokers and 22.9% were former smokers.
16  Mortality 
rates by sex for current smokers were subtracted from one and multiplied by the number of 
current smokers that survived to age  1 − a  to estimate the number of current smokers by sex 
surviving to age a.  The number of surviving former smokers by sex and age were calculated in a 
similar manner.  The number of never smokers of sex s surviving to age a is estimated by 
subtracting the number of current plus former smoking survivors from the total number of 
survivors.  The number of survivors at each age in their respective smoking class as shown in 
Table A.1, is then used to calculate the probability that a person age a will survive to age j.  For 
each smoking class the survival probabilities are in turn used to calculateBPV . 
NMSSTRs for single primary beneficiaries that account for smoking-attributable 
mortality by age, gender, and earnings class are shown in Table 2.  As expected, a comparison of 
the results in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that a smoker’s shorter life expectancy increases the 
NMSSTR at each age.  A single male current smoker age 55 with lifetime average earnings faces 
a net tax rate of 6.51%, which is approximately 3 percentage points higher than the rate 
estimated under the common mortality assumption (3.55%).  The NMSSTR for a single male 
former smoker age 55 with average lifetime earnings is 4.92%, which is approximately 1.4 
percentage points higher than the rate estimated under the common mortality assumption.  The  
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NMSSTR for a single male never smoker age 55 with average lifetime earnings is 1.25%, which 
is approximately 5.3 percentage points lower than the rate incurred by a 55-year-old current 
smoker and approximately 3.7 percentage points lower than the rate incurred by a 55-year-old 
former smoker.   
A single female current smoker age 55 with lifetime average earnings faces an NMSSTR 
of 5.13%, which is approximately 1.4 percentage points lower than the rate estimated for a 55-
year-old current smoking male with lifetime average earnings.  The gender differential in 
NMSSTRs for both current and former smokers at each age is larger than the differential 
estimated under the common mortality assumption.  In addition, 65-year-old female current and 
former smokers now incur a lower NMSSTR than do their male counterparts.  These gender 
differences result from males smoking at higher rates than females and having a higher smoking-
attributable mortality risk. 
As shown in Table 3, a 55-year-old male current smoker with lifetime average earnings 
and a dependent spouse who also smokes incurs an NMSSTR of 3.17%, which is more than 3 
percentage points higher than the rate estimated under the common mortality assumption (-0.02). 
In addition, this rate is 1.69 percentage points higher than the rate incurred by a 55-year-old male 
former smoker with lifetime average earnings and a dependent spouse who formerly smoked 
(1.48%) and approximately 5.5 percentage points higher than the rate incurred by a 55-year-old 




III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  As have previous studies, we find that social security treats singles and two-earner 
couples less equitably than one-earner couples.  The results of this study add to previous findings 
by showing that NMSSTRs also vary by smoking status.
17  The higher tax rates that smokers 
incur may reduce their labor supply.
18  Given that social security is financed by a payroll tax 
levied on earnings, any reduction in labor supply will have implications for the system’s funding. 
However, the aggregate effect of smoking on the OASI Trust Fund’s finances would depend on 
how smoking redistributes benefits from smokers to never smokers and the resulting labor 
supply response to changes in marginal tax rates. 
While Social Security has reduced poverty among elderly Americans, young widows are 
at increased risk of living in poverty because of the premature death of their spouse (Redja 1994; 
Englehart & Gruber, 2004; Sevak, Weir & Willis, 2004).  Many of those individuals who smoke 
die prematurely.  Approximately 536,000 adults in the United States under age 65 died of 
smoking-attributable illnesses between 1997 and 2001.
19 Widows with no children under age 16 
in their care who were married to fully insured workers who died prematurely may be ineligible 
for Social Security benefits until they attain age 60.  Estimates suggest that 15 percent of women 
aged 54, too young to qualify for Social Security benefits, fall in poverty following the death of 
their husband (Sevak et al. 2004).
20   As a result, it has been suggested that Social Security is 
failing to live up to one of its’ primary goals of providing adequate survivors insurance for older 
low-earning Americans (Gustman & Steinmeier, 2002).  One proposal designed to improve 
Social Security adequacy is to lower the eligibility age for widows from 60 years to 55 years 
(Redja, 1994).
21  In addition to the establishment of private accounts, two of the three plans  
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proposed by The President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) recommended an 
increase in benefits for low-earnings widows and widowers.    
Because low-earnings workers are more likely to smoke and smokers are more likely 
than never smokers to die prematurely, an unintended distributional effect of enacting proposals 
that would reduce widows’ retirement age and/or increase retirement benefits among low-
earnings widows’ and widowers’ would be to redistribute benefits from never smokers to 
smokers, which would benefit behavior that is detrimental to health.  As with life insurance, 
perhaps this unintended effect could be offset by smokers paying a higher premium, in this case 
a smoker’s insurance tax rate.  The revenue generated from a tax levied on current smokers could 
be added to the OASI trust fund and used to reduce financial hardship currently faced by young 
widows and widowers’ by paying increased benefits and/or benefits at an earlier age.  In 
addition, the higher tax penalty associated with smoking may increase cessation.  The aggregate 
impact of such a change on the various trust fund finances would be a valuable addition to the 
debates surrounding the system’s solvency and ways to reduce poverty among widows.           
As in previous studies, these results are limited in that they are based on hypothetical 
workers; thus the relative importance of various economic assumptions and differences is an 
empirical question.
22 Because analysis with money flows over time may be sensitive to the 
choice of discount rate, selective results shown in Tables 1 through 3 for workers with average 
lifetime earnings were re-estimated under alternative discount rate assumptions.  As shown in 
Table 4, a lower discount rate reduces the NMSSTR at each age. 
23  
Although the calculations presented are complex, they oversimplify the Social Security 
program in a number of ways.  First, we focused on OASI and ignored the DI and HI  
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components of Social Security.  Second, we ignored benefits for dependent children of young 
widows or widowers.  Third, we ignored the possibility of divorce and remarriage.  Fourth, the 
employer portion of the payroll tax is tax exempt, and given the progressive nature of income 
taxation this disproportionately benefits higher earning individuals.   Thus, the NMSSTR for 
high-earning individuals may be lower than the estimates reported.   Fifth, smoking prevalence 
was held constant across earnings class.  Because lower-earning individuals have a higher 
smoking prevalence than do higher-earning individuals, low-earning individuals’ NMSSTRs 
may be higher than the rates reported,  whereas average- and high- earning individuals may have 
NMSSTRs that are lower than the rates reported.    
A final potential limitation to our results is that the mortality risk measures used to 
account for the mortality difference among current and former smokers are adjusted for sex and 
age only.  Other risk factors such as educational status, diet, and alcohol consumption that are 
correlated with smoking were unaccounted for in the mortality risk measure that was used.   As a 
consequence, the NMSSTR estimates may overstate the tax penalty associated with smoking 
(Shoven, Sundberg & Bunker, 1987 and Thun et al., 1997).  However, this limitation may not 
pose too great a problem, because evidence in the literature suggests that when behavioral and 
demographic factors correlated with smoking were taken into account, the higher mortality risks 
faced by smokers did not change much (Malarcher, Schulman, Epstein, Thun, Mowery, Pierce et 
al., 2000; Thun et al., 1997).  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
  The analyses reveal that smokers will incur higher net marginal tax rates than do never 
smokers and may reduce their labor supply.
24  Any reduction in labor supply among smokers  
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will have implications for the system’s funding.  Knowledge of the distributional effects of 
smoking on Social Security is important not only from the standpoint of the system’s funding, 
but also from the perspective of informing smoking cessation efforts (Rice, 1984).  The higher 
net marginal tax rates can be avoided by never smoking or reduced by quitting smoking.  Finally, 
smoking status should be considered in assessing Social Security legislative proposals designed 
to reduce system inequities or promote social adequacy in particular, amendments designed to 
reduce poverty among young widows and widowers.  Failure to do so may unintentionally 
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Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Single Beneficiaries and Primary Male Beneficiaries with a Dependent Spouse 
by Earnings Classification and Age in 2002.
 a 
 






















35 -4.68 5.17  8.05 -2.11  6.08 8.48 -9.75 3.37  7.21  10.6 
45 -8.24 3.90  7.46 -4.94  5.07 8.01 -13.54 2.02  6.58  10.6 
55 -10.34 3.15  7.11 -9.22 3.55  7.30 -19.26 -0.02  5.62  10.6 
65 -15.33 1.38  6.28 -17.86  0.48  5.86 -31.37 -4.32  3.60  10.6 
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-earnings workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-earnings and high-
earnings workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed.  The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.  
 
Table 2 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Single Primary Beneficiaries 
by Sex, Smoking Status, Earnings Classification, and Age in 2002.
a 



















Age  in  2002           
35 -0.14  6.78  8.81  -2.87  5.81 8.35 -6.84 4.40 7.69 
45 -2.83  5.83  8.36  -6.09  4.67 7.82  -10.78  3.00 7.04 
55 -4.77  5.13  8.04  -8.13  3.94 7.48  -12.86  2.26 6.69 
65 -9.84  3.33  7.19  -13.13  2.16 6.64  -17.62  0.57 5.90 
           



















Age  in  2002           
35  3.96 8.24 9.49 0.73 7.09 8.96 -7.68 4.10 7.55 
45 2.21  7.62  9.20  -1.61  6.26 8.57  -11.16  2.86 6.97 
55 -0.91  6.51  8.68  -5.37  4.92 7.94  -15.69  1.25 6.22 
65  -8.84  3.69  7.36 -13.68 1.97 6.55  -23.50  -1.53 4.92 
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-earnings workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-earnings and high-
earnings workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed.  The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.  
 
Table 3 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Male Primary Beneficiaries with a Dependent Spouse  
by Earnings Classification, Smoking Status, and Age in 2002.
a 
Low Earner  Primary Beneficiary Current Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Former Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Never Smoker 



















Age  in  2002            
35  -4.39  -6.41 -8.68 -5.56 -7.14  -8.97  -13.77 -15.42 -17.44 
45 -6.53  -8.57  -10.87  -8.53  -10.18 -12.10 -18.21 -20.01 -22.22 
55  -10.30  -12.38 -14.71 -13.31 -15.05 -17.05 -24.26 -26.21 -28.57 
65  -20.90  -22.95 -25.18 -24.76 -26.51 -28.47 -35.42 -37.38 -39.68 
            
Avge. Earner  Primary Beneficiary Current Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Former Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Never Smoker 



















Age  in  2002            
35  5.27  4.55 3.75 4.86 4.29 3.64 1.94 1.35 0.63 
45  4.51  3.78 2.97 3.80 3.21 2.53 0.36 -0.28  -1.07 
55  3.17  2.43 1.60 2.10 1.48 0.77 -1.80 -2.49 -3.33 
65  -0.60  -1.33 -2.12 -1.97 -2.59 -3.29 -5.76 -6.46 -7.28 
            
High Earner  Primary Beneficiary Current Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Former Smoker  Primary Beneficiary Never Smoker 



















Age  in  2002            
35  8.10  7.77 7.39 7.91 7.64 7.34 6.54 6.26 5.93 
45  7.75  7.40 7.02 7.41 7.14 6.82 5.80 5.50 5.13 
55  7.12  6.77 6.38 6.62 6.33 5.99 4.79 4.46 4.07 
65  5.35  5.01 4.64 4.71 4.42 4.09 2.93 2.60 2.22 
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Low-earnings workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, average-earnings and high-
earnings workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively.  A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed.  The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.   
 
Table 4 
Net Marginal Social Security Tax Rate Estimates for Average Earner Primary Beneficiaries and Dependents  
by Sex, Smoking Status and Age in 2002
a 
  Primary Beneficiary  Smoking Status of Male Primary Beneficiary  
and Dependent Spouse 



















Both Never  
Smokers 
Discount rate = 2.2%                
35  5.83 4.56 2.69 7.69 6.23 2.35  5.34  4.30  0.50 
45  5.08 3.68 1.64 7.19 5.59 1.52  4.68  3.35  -0.95 
55  4.76 3.42 1.50 6.28 4.54 0.45  3.49  1.83  -2.88 
65  3.42 2.18 0.47 3.85 2.08  -1.58 0.07  -1.84  -6.32 
Discount rate = 3.0%                
35  7.07 6.17 4.87 8.42 7.35 4.59  5.67  4.77  1.38 
45  6.18 5.11 3.57 7.84 6.58 3.44  4.97  3.76  -0.19 
55  5.54 4.44 2.89 6.81 5.35 1.95  3.73  2.17  -2.28 
65  3.88 2.79 1.32 4.20 2.61  -0.62 0.24  -1.60  -5.94 
Discount rate = 3.7%                
35  7.87 7.21 6.25 8.90 8.09 6.02  5.90  5.09  1.96 
45  6.95 6.10 4.89 8.30 7.28 4.77  5.18  4.06  0.34 
55  6.13 5.20 3.90 7.22 5.95 3.06  3.92  2.43  -1.83 
65  4.25 3.28 1.97 4.49 3.04 0.13 0.38  -1.42  -5.63 
aWorkers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age.  Average-earnings workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.32.  The growth rate in real 
earnings is set at 1.1 percent.  Estimates account for smoking attributable mortality and taxation of benefits.  
 
  Table A.1 
  Life Tables Used in NMSSTR Estimation, Females 






















20  98922 18538  22604  57780  61  90138 15614  20076  54448 
21  98877 18530  22593  57754  62  89374 15360  19854  54159 
22  98827 18520  22582  57725  63  88552 15089  19617  53846 
23  98781 18512  22571  57698  64  87657 14796  19359  53502 
24    98736 18503  22561  57672  65  86680 14479  19079  53122 
25    98688 18494  22550  57644  66  85631 14143  18779  52709 
26    98639 18485  22539  57615  67  84512 13788  18460  52264 
27    98589 18476  22528  57586  68  83281 13402  18110  51768 
28    98539 18466  22516  57557  69  81982 13001  17743  51238 
29    98483 18456  22503  57524  70  80556 12567  17342  50647 
30    98424 18445  22490  57489  71  79026 12109  16914  50004 
31    98362 18433  22476  57453  72  77410 11633  16464  49313 
32    98296 18421  22461  57415  73  75666 11130  15982  48554 
33    98225 18407  22444  57373  74  73802 10604  15470  47729 
34    98148 18393  22427  57328  75  71800 10051  14924  46824 
35   98064  18363  22402  57299  76  69639  9470  14340  45828 
36   97970  18329  22374  57267  77  67366  8877  13732  44757 
37   97869  18293  22344  57232  78  64935  8262  13088  43585 
38   97759  18253  22311  57195  79  62372  7636  12416  42320 
39   97640  18210  22276  57153  80  59621  6989  11704  40928 
40   97500  18160  22234  57105  81  56681  6327  10954  39400 
41   97355  18109  22192  57055  82  53660  5680  10195  37785 
42   97194  18051  22144  56999  83  50324  5002  9371  35951 
43   97023  17990  22093  56940  84  47075  4382  8585  34109 
44   96830  17921  22036  56873  85  43542  3751  7747  32045 
45   96627  17849  21976  56802  86  39919  3151  6909  29859 
46   96405  17770  21910  56724  87  36246  2595  6083  27569 
47   96176  17689  21843  56644  88  32571  2090  5281  25201 
48   95928  17602  21769  56557  89  28943  1643  4516  22784 
49   95654  17505  21689  56460  90  25411  1258  3800  20354 
50   95364  17403  21603  56357  91  22024  936  3141  17947 
51   95059  17297  21513  56249  92  18828  675  2549  15604 
52   94724  17179  21415  56130  93  15862  471  2027  13364 
53   94380 17060  21314  56007  94  13158  317  1578  11264 
54   93989 16924  21199  55866  95  10737  205  1200  9332 
55   93572  16780  21077  55716  96  8613  127  892  7594 
56   93095  16616  20937  55542  97  6785  75  646  6064 
57   92629  16456  20801  55372  98  5245  42  455  4747 
58   92084  16270  20642  55172  99  3977  23  312  3642 
59   91491  16069  20469  54953  100  2954  12  208  2735 
60 90826  15845 20275 54706            
 
Table A.1 (cont.) 
  Life Tables Used in NMSSTR Estimation, Males 






















20  98436 22778  33724  41934  61  83612 16028  26805  40779 
21  98299 22746  33677  41875  62  82483 15530  26276  40677 
22  98157 22714  33629  41815  63  81255 14998  25705  40552 
23  98021 22682  33582  41757  64  79946 14442  25101  40403 
24    97882 22650  33534  41698  65  78556 13865  24463  40228 
25    97746 22618  33488  41640  66  77071 13262  23788  40021 
26    97614 22588  33443  41584  67  75501 12641  23081  39779 
27    97479 22557  33396  41526  68  73809 11989  22326  39494 
28    97352 22527  33353  41472  69  72012 11318  21532  39162 
29    97225 22498  33309  41418  70  70087 10622  20692  38773 
30   97091  22467  33263  41361  71  68039  9908  19809  38322 
31   96954  22435  33216  41302  72  65864  9180  18884  37800 
32   96813  22403  33168  41242  73  63621  8461  17945  37215 
33   96678  22371  33122  41185  74  61202  7721  16949  36532 
34   96526  22336  33070  41120  75  58680  6989  15930  35761 
35   96367  22251  32990  41125  76  56028  6262  14878  34887 
36   96196  22161  32905  41131  77  53251  5549  13802  33901 
37   96016  22065  32815  41136  78  50398  4865  12722  32811 
38   95823  21963  32719  41141  79  47454  4211  11637  31606 
39   95610  21851  32612  41147  80  44370  3582  10533  30255 
40   95381  21731  32498  41152  81  41252  3003  9452  28797 
41   95128  21598  32373  41157  82  38102  2475  8399  27228 
42   94859  21458  32239  41163  83  34798  1982  7335  25481 
43   94577  21311  32099  41167  84  31719  1578  6388  23753 
44   94266  21150  31945  41171  85  28478  1207  5435  21836 
45   93929  20976  31778  41175  86  25296  897  4548  19851 
46   93569  20791  31600  41178  87  22212  646  3739  17828 
47   93171  20587  31404  41179  88  19266  449  3015  15803 
48   92755  20376  31199  41180  89  16494  300  2381  13812 
49   92296  20144  30974  41178  90  13925  193  1840  11893 
50   91809  19900  30735  41174  91  11585  118  1388  10078 
51   91286  19639  30480  41167  92  9490  69  1022  8399 
52   90722  19360  30205  41157  93  7648  38  732  6877 
53   90138 19073  29921  41144  94  6059  20 510  5529 
54   89505 18765  29614  41126  95  4715  10 345  4360 
55   88850  18449  29298  41103  96  3601  4  226  3371 
56   88102  18092  28938  41072  97  2698  2  143  2553 
57   87369  17746  28586  41037  98  1982  1  88  1894 
58   86542  17360  28191  40991  99  1426  0  52  1374 
59   85644  16945  27764  40935  100  1005  0  29  975 
60 84637  16487 27287 40863           
aThis refers to the number of persons by smoking status reaching exact age a during the year in the stationary 




                         
1 Estimated from information contained in Table 4.B4 of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2004.   Available online from the Social Security 
Administration at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2004/4b.pdf  (verified April 19, 2005). 
 
2 While many of the researchers recognize the link between the payroll tax paid on an additional dollar of earnings 
and anticipated future benefits, their analysis typically calculates the comprehensive marginal tax rate using the 
social security statutory rate and as a consequence their results are overstated (Browning, 1985 and Burkhauser & 
Turner, 1985). 
 
3 There is a limit to the benefit amount that family members may receive each month. The limit varies, but is 
generally equal to about 150 to 180 percent of PIA. If the sum of the benefits payable to family members exceeds 
this limit, their benefits will be reduced.  However, any benefits paid to a surviving divorced widow or widower, do 
not count toward this maximum amount (see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004).   
  
4 The 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act indexed the benefit formula's bend points to the growth rate in 
average covered earnings.  The marginal replacement rates were fixed at 90, 32, and 15 percent, respectively (see 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004). 
 
5 The tax rate ignores the disability insurance (DI) and health insurance (HI) contribution rates.  Including both rates 
increases the net marginal social security tax rate by the statutory amount.  In 2002, the combined employee-
employer DI and HI rates were 1.8 and 2.9 percent, respectively (see U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2004). 
 
6 Brittain (1972) found that the payroll tax reduced employee earnings by the full amount of the tax. 
 
7 The formula in Equation 3 estimates the actuarial present value of anticipated future benefits relative to some 
benchmark retirement age.  The age chosen here, f, is defined as the full benefit retirement age.  This corresponds to 
the age at which an individual is first eligible for retirement benefits without actuarial adjustment.  Following 
legislation implemented in the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, the full benefit retirement age, currently 
65, is scheduled to increase 2 months each year beginning in the year 2000.  Between 2005 and 2016 the full benefit 
retirement age will remain at 66.  In 2017, the full benefit retirement age is scheduled to increase 2 months per 
annum and will be fixed at age 67 for those attaining age 62 after the year 2022.  The retirement age for workers 
with a full benefit retirement age in terms of years and months is rounded to the next full year in all calculations. 
 
8 The economic assumptions used in the calculations are based on the 2005 Social Security Board of Trustees best 
cost estimates (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2005). 
 
9 To qualify for social security benefits, an individual must be fully insured.  The measure used to determine 
whether a worker is eligible for retirement benefits is quarters of coverage.  Under current legislation, a worker is 
fully insured if he obtains one quarter of coverage for each year after 1950 (or age 21, if later) and before the year 
one dies, becomes disabled, or attains age 62 (Social Security Administration 2001).  The minimum number of 
quarters required to be fully insured ranges from six to forty. 
 
10 Unpublished insurance rate estimates were provided by the Social Security Office of the Actuary.  The data 
contained projections covering the period 2002 by sex and age for the number of fully insured workers as a 
percentage of the total population. 
 
11 A rate of 3 percent was chosen to approximate an individual's rate of time preference.  As before, this rate chosen 
was based on recommendations contained in the 2005 Trustees Report (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2005b). 
 
12 The probability that a male age 65 was fully insured for benefits in the year 2002 was 0.929.  In comparison, the  
 
                                                                               
probability that a 65-year-old female was fully insured was 0.741.  As before, these estimates are unpublished and 
were provided by the Social Security Office of the Actuary.   
 
13 The Social Security Administration (2001) reports that, of the 21.4 million women age 62 and older in 2000, 8.2 
million were entitled to primary benefits only, 5.9 million were dually entitled and 7.4 million were solely entitled to 
benefits as a dependent spouse and failed to qualify for benefits based on their own earnings history (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2001). 
 
14 Widows and widowers become eligible to receive survivor benefits at age 60.  However, children and disability 
may lower the age of eligibility.  A detailed explanation of how these criteria may affect the age that survivors may 
be first eligible for benefits is contained in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Annual Statistical 
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin 2002. 
 
15 Mortality ratios for current and former smokers were obtained from Thun, Day-Lally, Myers et al. (1997). 
 
16 Smoking prevalence for current and former smokers were obtained from the CDC (CDC, 2004). 
 
17 It has been suggested that premature deaths attributable to smoking saves Social Security money (Shoven, 
Sunderberg & Bunker, 1987).  One should not infer from these results that because smokers’ incur a higher 
NMSSTR that they pay more than their fair share to Social Security.  The reason is that the higher NMSSTR may 
cause smokers’ to reduce their labor supply and thereby reduce social security contributions.  In addition, social 
security disability payments to persons with smoking attributable diseases and payments to dependents and survivors 
of deceased smokers’ will offset reductions in future system liabilities that stem from smoking attributable death. 
 
18 In addition to reducing hours of work an increase in taxes may decrease labor force participation.  Specifically, 
smoking may lead to a reduction in labor supply through early retirement.  According to the Social Security 
Advisory Council’s 1997 report, retirement studies have typically used average life expectancy by age as opposed to 
predictions based on health status in their analysis.  Those smokers in poor health that retire early may be responding 
to financial incentives that are masked in analyses that use average life expectancies. The report is available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/tirs1.txt (verified April 19, 2005). 
 
19 These estimates are unpublished and were estimated from Smoking-Attributable Mortality Morbidity and 
Economic Cost (SAMMEC) data maintained by the Office on Smoking and Health, CDC.  SAMMEC estimates are 
available online from CDC at http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/sammec/  (verified April 19, 2005). 
 
20 We do not know how many young widows under age 60 are ineligible for benefits because they are currently too 
young and as a consequence live in poverty.  However, we do know that in the year 2000, 45,680 widows received 
benefits because they had a child under age 16 in their care (see Table 5.F1 of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2001). 
 
21 It is unclear why age 55 is recommended.  Widows under age 55, whose eligibility is based solely on age, would 
continue to be ineligible for social security benefits and the system would fail to live up to one of its’ main goals of 
providing adequate retirement security.   Additional information on proposals aimed at changing social security 
survivorship benefits and poverty among widows is available from Anzick and Weaver, 2001.  
  
22 However, this is the best one can do since the real world data are unavailable (Garrett, 1995).  Also for a 
discussion of the usefulness of results based on hypothetical worker data see Leimer, 1995. 
 
23 The calculations shown in Table 1-3 ignored the personal income tax bracket at which social security retirement 
benefits will be taxed during retirement. Thus, the estimates shown in Table 4 assumed that social security benefits 
will be subject to a federal income tax rate of 15 percent.  For a single male current smoker age 55, assuming a 
discount rate of 3%, taxation of benefits increased his NMSSTR by 0.3 percentage points (6.51% vs. 6.81%). 
24 The evidence is mixed on the impact of Social Security on labor supply, although the predominant research in this 
area has focused on the labor supply responses of older workers (Krueger and Meyer 2002).  